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CONSCIENCE AND THE LAW: THE ENGLISH
CRIMINAL JURY
Robert C. Palmer*

By Thomas Andrew Green.
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1985. Pp. xx, 409. $34.

VERDICT ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE.

The criminal trial jury has played a central role in Anglo-American history both for the maintenance of order and in the constitutional
limitation of governmental power. The jury is an occasion for familiarization of the citizenry with governmental process - a process of
co-optation and indoctrination - as well as a means of qualifying
power by inserting into the governmental process lay and communal
standards. But those standards are discretionary, and the discretionary aspect of the jury, particularly for those subject to its workings, is
simultaneously worrying and hopeful.
Verdict According to Conscience analyzes jury c:J.iscretion in England from the twelfth to the eighteenth centuries. The scope itself
makes the work extraordinarily ambitious. And Green's accomplishment is impressive; he has produced a stimulating, thought-provoking
study. His focus on jury discretion - the operation of conscience in
the rendering of verdicts - yields an intriguing investigation of jury
behavior; it also provides a helpful overview of the development of the
criminal trial jury into a constitutional right. The book's substance
demonstrates thoughtful consideration of the issues involved. Its exemplary organization, with frequent summaries and clearly explained
theses, exhibits an extraordinary degree of concern for the reader.
Verdict According to Conscience is in three parts: medieval (Origins), early modem (Transformations), and eighteenth century (Resolutions). Each part contains three chapters. Roughly, the first chapter
in each part is an institutional overview; the second examines the role
of conscience in trials; the third explores the interaction between jury
and bench necessitated by such jury behavior. As might be expected,
however, the institutional chapters tend also to include arguments relating to jury behavior; in the second part the institutional overview
also provides the chronological coverage of the jury under the Tudors
and first Stuarts. The parts also involve different approaches to the
topic. The medieval portion is heavily grounded in analysis of com• Adler Fellow, Associate Professor of Law, Institute of Bill of Rights Law, MarshallWythe School of Law, The College of William and Mary. B.A. 1970, University of Oregon;
Ph.D. 1977, University of Iowa. - Ed.
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mon-run criminal trials; the other two parts are more, but not exclusively, concerned with treatises and classic great cases.
Green demonstrates a continuity of discretion in the medieval
criminal trial jury. When criminal prosecutions utilized presentment
jilries and the ordeal, the presentment jury presented only those really
suspected, protecting those only slightly suspect. When the trial jury
replaced the ordeal in the 1220s as the normal method of proof, it
assumed part of the discretionary activity of the presentment jury.
That assumption of discretion was natural, because the same people
often served on both juries. The overlap in membership became impractical in the early fourteenth century with the demise of the general
eyre and the adoption of the commission of gaol delivery as the normal judicial commission for the trial of crimes. Nascent ideas of due
process reinforced the physical and chronological separation between
presentment and trial juries, so that by the mid-fourteenth century the
accused faced two discrete panels 1 (Chapter One).
Green traces medieval nullification of the law primarily in homicide cases. Late fourteenth-century coroners' rolls distinguished between "murder" (stealthy homicide) and simple homicide (roughly,
manslaughter). That distinction was not legal, since the law dictated
that both were capital offenses. But the same social distinction is demonstrable from standardized self-defense verdicts through the fourteenth century, inferable from thirteenth-century evidence, and
explicit through the beginning of the twelfth century. The jury felt
free, from its inception, to render verdicts according to a social conception that was fundamentally at variance with the letter of the law
(Chap~er Two).
This jury activity inevitably affected the structure of criminal law.
The harsh simplicity of the legal structure within which the jury inserted its verdicts disguised the close cases and complicated factual
situations that would have produced fine distinctions. Even so, fourteenth-century criminal law was not static. The category of justifiable
homicide grew to include the slaying of burglars, arsonists, and robbers caught in the act, and accidental homicide ceased to require a
pardon. But juries protected those guilty of simple homicide by classifying them as self-defenders; that exercise of mercy, with the consequent judicial suspicion of self-defenders, prevented the emergence of
sophisticated criminal law. The history of jury nullification of the law
explains the structure of medieval criminal law (Chapter Three).
Two factors distinguished the early modem jury from the medieval
jury. By far the more important was the development of the prosecutor. The Marian bail and commitment statutes of 1554-1555 assured
that there would be an official version of the case available to judge
1. The separation between trial and presentment juries also resulted in trial juries of a lower
social standing, prompting growing governmental concern about the jury.
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and jury and that witnesses would be bound over to give evidence
against the accused. The interest in evidence meant that the jury was
no longer to be self-informing; the presentation of evidence prompted
judicial commentary together with the charge to the jury. Judges also
attempted to manage the jury by fining jurors or binding them over for
examination by Star Chamber. And the presentation of complicated
life situations to the court instead of standardized verdicts allowed the
rapid formulation of a much more complex criminal law. The development of this prosecutorial side meant less jury discretion.
At the same time, another institutional factor made the former
jury discretion less necessary: the availability of a serious but noncapital punishment for simple homicide. In the fifteenth century benefit of
clergy had become available in practice to almost any male offender.
Thereafter Parliament excluded the worst categories of offenders from
access, but simple homicides retained the benefit. Punishment for
such first offenses was branding and imprisonment. The ready availability of benefit of clergy for simple homicide removed the major area
of disagreement between the formal criminal law and social attitudes,
with the result that the reduced jury role in law nullification was without controversy (Chapter Four).
The continuous history of jury discretion, Green argues, made possible the Leveller argument that jurors were judges of the law. Green
uses John Lilburne's trials to trace the development of that radical
pro-discretion, anti-rule conceptualization of the jury. Until
Lilbume's 1649 trial Leveller rhetoric about the jury was relatively
traditional, insisting on local trials and local jurors but adopting the
law/fact distinction between the functions of judges and jurors. After
the 1649 trial a theory rapidly developed of total jury control over the
law, analogous to lay control over the interpretation of Scripture.
Then, in his 1653 trial, Lilbume enunciated a radical theory of jury
nullification of statute if the jury considered the statute discordant
with English fundamental law (Chapter Five).
The recognition of a jury right against coercion incorporated part
of the Leveller tradition. Bushel, as a juror, responded to Penn's argument that jurors were judges of the law and acquitted him contrary to
the evidence. Imprisoned for his recalcitrance, he came before the
king's court by habeas corpus. On that matter Vaughan wrote his famous opinion establishing the jury right against coercion. He based
his opinion not on the jury's right to nullify the law, but on its right to
find fact. For Vaughan, law did not exist in the abstract; it grew out of
fact. Denying the possibility of ascertaining completely objective
facts, Vaughan refused to second-guess the jurors' determinations,
since their job was to ascertain fact and apply the law to it. The process was too complex, law and fact too intricately interwoven, and jury
right over fact-finding too secure to justify judicial disciplining of ju-
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rors. Vaughan effectively hid the jury's power over the law within its
power over fact (Chapter Six).
Further major change in the criminal trial occurred only late in :the
eighteenth century or early in the nineteenth century, with the increasing intervention of lawyers in criminal cases and the development of a
law of evidence. That development lies outside the scope of Green's
analysis. But completely within the eighteenth century the Crown became much more selective in its prosecution. With the availability of
transportation as a punishment and with the jury right against coercion, the bench openly admitted the jury into its role of mitigation.
While this explicit exercise of authority contrary to oath elicited much
criticism, no one doubted its necessity until the law of sanctions was
altered. The growing conviction that social factors qualified free will
made such reform seem all the more pressing, but it also made the
temporary retention of jury mitigation to avoid capital punishment all
the more necessary. And the constitutional role of the jury was such
that no one wanted to eliminate completely the possibility of jury nullification of the law (Chapter Seven).
Judicial acceptance of jury mitigation in felony cases, however,
contradicted the law of seditious libel. In prosecutions for criticism
that undermined governmental authority, the bench tried to limit juries to determination only of publication, reserving the seditiousness of
the tract as a matter oflaw. Writers regularly chose to analogize seditious libel with homicide rather than theft. Theft was considered uniformly and always bad, such that jury activity beyond the strict
finding of fact would only be in mitigation of the rigor of the law.
Homicide, however, was not always bad and could be justified. The
jury in homicide thus had a more extensive role to play. If seditious
libel was like theft, the bench could logically restrict the jury; if like
homicide, it could not. Nonetheless, the acceptance of jury mitigation
in felony inevitably affected the role of the jury in seditious libel. Finally, at the end of the eighteenth century, Fox's Libel Act allowed the
jury in seditious libel cases to return a general verdict, a verdict thus
that could determine the seditiousness of the tract (Chapter Eight).
The lively tradition of respectable jury mitigation of the law ended,
however, roughly with the eighteenth century. The development of
the law of evidence and the intervention of counsel in criminal trials
elevated the value of consistency in determination, whereas jury mitigation operated in a random manner. More to the point, parliamentary reform of the law of sanctions eliminated many of the capital
offenses that had made jury intervention seem necessary. Jury intervention, while far from dead, no longer played the constitutional or
normal role it once had (Chapter Nine).
Green's view of jury activity is a complex of social, legal, and intellectual history. Throughout he emphasizes the relationship between
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jury activity, general social attitudes, and the formation of substantive
law. That relationship was interactive, not linear. His versatility is
impressive. His sensitivity to his sources and their context is laudable.
He is confident of his sources, and he has established a framework for
future research. The establishment of that framework is a great service, even though the sheer volume of research on the criminal trial
jury dictates that many of Green's particular arguments will be
superseded.

******

Verdict According to Conscience is above all a history of the criminal trial jury. But the criminal law was not a world to itself. Justices
presided over both criminal and noncriminal juries. A priori, study of
the normal common law jury should reinforce study of the criminal
trial jury. Such a perspective, not usual among historians of medieval
criminal law, alters the characterization of the Angevin revolution, the
origins of trial jury discretion, and the continuation of jury discretion
beyond its origins.
The Assize of Clarendon2 (1166) and the Assize of Northampton3
(1176) first mandated extensive use of presentment juries. Green portrays those enactments as a jurisdictional revolution: decisive royal
assertion of "jurisdiction over trial and execution for all felony at the
expense of existing, competing jurisdictions" (p. 7). Maitland similarly characterized the origins of the possessory property actions as a
decisive assertion of royal jurisdiction at the expense of competing jurisdictions. Newer scholarship portrays these legal changes as regulatory innovations, not as jurisdictional transfers. 4 The question of
appropriate characterization is relatively unimportant for Green's concerns, but it affects the way in which his work relates to general legal
history.
Other Angevin legal innovations outside the context of property
were regulatory. The Constitutions of Clarendon5 (1164) was an attempt to set down English custom regarding conflicting royal and ecclesiastical matters; its primary concerns were regulatory. 6 That
2. 1 SOURCES OF ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 76-80 (C. Stephenson & F. Marcham
eds. & trans. 1937).
3. Id. at 80-83.
4. s. MILSOM, THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF ENGLISH FEUDALISM (1976); Palmer, The Economic and Cultural Impact of the Origins ofProperty, 1180-1220, 3 LAW & HIST. REV. 375, 37596 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Palmer, Economic and Cultural Impact]; Palmer, The Feudal
Framework of English Law (Book Review), 79 MICH. L. REV. 1130 (1981); Palmer, The Origins
of Property in Eng/and, 3 LAW & HIST. REV. 1 (1985).
5. SOURCES OF ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, supra note 2, at 73-76.
6. The traditional view considers the Constitutions of Clarendon as either a defense or an
assertion of royal power. 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 138-48 (2d ed. 1898); 2 id. at 198. The Constitutions were
regulatory in that, while the king acknowledged a certain separateness to ecclesiastical organization, he wanted to assure royal supervision, whether before his justices or in his feudal court.
Chapters 2-4 and 7-12 accord with the regulatory purpose; the remaining chapters, 1, 5-6, and
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provision preceded the Assize of Clarendon and mentioned presentment jurors who could be made available to ecclesiastical courts. 7 The
regulatory context of this first major appearance of the presentment
jury, together with the new view of noncriminal actions already mentioned, suggests a regulatory purpose behind the presentment jury provision in the Assize of Clarendon.
The supposition that Angevin crime-oriented innovations were essentially similar to other innovations demands a difficult reconceptualization. The supposition receives some support from the contemporary perception that the provisions of the Assize of Clarendon
and the Assize of Northampton were temporary. 8 Jurisdictional
transfers tend to be permanent. One could argue that the provision
was regulatory in providing for royal supervision of preexisting presentment juries.9 A better argument would be that the presentment
jury was not originally a strict alternative to private appeals of felony,
but a mechanism to supervise such appeals. The presentment jury
provided the accusation when the appeal procedure failed. That perception allows a consistent portrayal of Henry II as not replacing
older forms or consciously centralizing, but only assuring that current
pi;ocedures operated effectively.
Green derives the origins of juror discretion from the work of the
early presentment jury. In this he relies on Groot's studies of the origins of the criminal trial jury and the activity of the prese~tment juries.10 Groot's work indicates a certain discretion on the part of the
presentment jury, and his logic suggests likewise that the trial jury
assumed part of that discretionary role (pp. 7-11). Green's reliance on
Groot's work, however, leads to omission of the more important element in the origins of jury discretion.
Green's view represents the best of traditional scholarship. That
tradition views the ordeal as asking essentially a factual question of
God: did the accused commit a felonious homicide? Included in this
factual question, but never spelled out, would be imponderables for
which God would be eminently competent, such as mens rea. 11 While
there is some documentary support for the factual nature of the ordeal
13-16, separate out issues that would cause conflict. SOURCES OF ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY, supra note 2, at 73-76.
7. Constitutions of Clarendon, c. 6.
8. Groot, The Jury of Presentment Before 1215, 26 AM. J. LEGAL Htsr. 1, 4 (1982);
Hurnard, The Jury of Presentment and the Assize of Clarendon, 56 ENG. Htsr. REV. 374, 391
(1941).
9. See H. RICHARDSON & G. SAYLES, THE GOVERNANCE OF MEDIEVAL ENGLAND FROM
THE CONQUEST TO MAGNA CARTA 198-202 (1963). Green indicates that his remarks about the
Assize of Clarendon may only be applicable to later practice. P. 7 n.17.
10. Groot, The Jury in Criminal Prosecutions Before 1215, 27 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 113
(1983); Groot, supra note 8.
11. Hyams, Trial by Ordeal: The Key to Proof in the Early Common Law, in ON THE LA ws
AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 90, 98-100 (M. Arnold, T. Green, s. Scully & s. White eds. 1981).
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question, 12 it was probably essentially moral.
Word usage illustrates the difference between the factual question
and the moral question. Coroners' rolls reported that an individual
fe/onice interfecit: he feloniously slew (p. 35). The accusation was
fact-oriented, about a past event and intent. The jury's verdict, however, was present tense and concerned guilt: cu/pabilis est (he is
guilty). Properly the concern was not only with the commission of the
crime but also with present stance - the appropriateness of punishment now. That concern could include repentance, reputation, reparation, recidivism. God, however, might be more forgiving than the
accused's community, and certainly more forgiving than the king.
Green asserts that these questions later seem to have been relevant for
trial juries (pp. 64, 98, 380). The concerns were plausibly original.
The moral nature of the ordeal question finds some basis in literary
accounts. In La Mort le Roi Artu 13 from around 1230 Sir Lancelot
killed Sir Gawain's brother, and Gawain rightfully wanted revenge:
Lancelot had clearly committed the homicide. Lancelot, however, offered reparation: he abased himself, offered to do homage ~o Gawain
and to go on pilgrimage alone. Gawain refused to accept this extraordinary offer from a very proud knight and insisted on proceeding
instead to battle. Sir Yvain, good friend to Gawain, thereafter scolded
him for not accepting Lancelot's reparation:
"My Lord, why have you undertaken this battle, and wrongly too, because he will defend himself with justice on his side? You have certainly
never done anything so foolhardy.
"He made such a great offer there," said Sir Yvain, "that I can only see
unreason on our side in Gawain's refusal. May God grant that things do
not tum out too badly for us, because I have certainly never feared disaster as much as I do now; I see right on their side and wrong on ours." 14

And indeed, after a long-fought battle - to show the balance between
Lancelot's reparation and his guilt of the factual past event - Lancelot successfully proved his innocence. 15 "Innocence" here, however,
only concerned present inappropriateness of punishment. An offer of
reparation, refused, reversed the appropriate result. This account of a
trial by battle suggests strongly a similar conclusion about the ordeal.
The question asked was not factual but moral, not about a past event
but about present standing before God.
A tenth-century account of an ordeal yields a similar framework.
12. The Assize of Clarendon, c. 2, requires that the oath preceding the ordeal be factual: "so
far as he knows, he has not been a robber or murderer or thief, or a receiver of them, since the
lord king has been king." SOURCES OF ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, supra note 2, at
77. That oath was not the typical ordeal oath, but it reflected the immediate royal concern.
13. THE DEATH OF KING ARTHUR (J. Cable trans. 1971).
14. Id. at 177-78.
15. Id. at 179-85.
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A slave had committed a crime, unknown to his master. The master
offered to give the presiding official both the slave and a pound of silver to save the slave's life; the slave's relatives also made proffers. The
reeve, however, was arrogant. He put the slave to the ordeal of fire,
heating the unjustly large piece of iron unusually hot. The slave experienced pain; and the community, observing the healing process,
saw the signs of guilt: pus and decay. The slave himself was guilty.
But the arrogant official did not see those signs and, humiliatingly, had
to pronounce the slave innocent. 16 Vis-a-vis the master, the official
was in the wrong, because he had refused appropriate reparation. The
ordeal yielded not a factual answer about a past event, but an evaluation appropriate for God: the calculus of present moral standing, albeit related to the past factual event.
Henry H's concern with the ordeal, then, would not indicate that
the ordeal was in disrepute. Henry was more concerned with the factual than with the moral question. Disreputable people caught with
stolen goods did not go to the ordeal. 17 Bad reputation could exile one
cleared by the ordeal.1 8 The ordeal was simply fashioned for a different question. Since the ordeal concerned present moral status, community certainty about commission of the crime would not be
discordant with an acquittal. The ordeal could fall into disrepute only
when theologians opposed demanding an answer from God or when
kings decided that factual questions were of paramount importance.
That conceptualization of the ordeal explains trial jury discretion.
The trial jury was the proof hesitantly substituted for the ordeal when
the Fourth Lateran Council prohibited the participation of clerics.
Monarchs were not sufficiently dissatisfied with the ordeal to abolish it
on their own or to have a ready substitute. But the trial jury, replacing
the ordeal, could render a general verdict concerning guilt in the present tense. If the ordeal investigated present moral status, the trial jury
could naturally have undertaken such matters also. Nor would the
bench at first have been shocked that it did. The question put to the
jury would itself tend to continue that concern, although the Crown's
interest in the factual question would generate some tension. Jury nullification of the law is more intrinsic to the trial jury than even Green
suspected.
The continuation of that discretion was not simply inertia. Green
senses the bench's concern about jury nullification in its sensitivity to
self-defense verdicts (pp. 67-68). The concern, however, could not
have been great. Those same justices presided over property cases in
which a jury, in an action on a writ of entry, could retail a version of a
16. Hyams, supra note 11, at 93-94. Hyams uses the account to stress the political nature of
community life, rather than reflecting on the nature of the question being asked.
17. Assize of Clarendon, c. 12.
18. Assize of Clarendon, c. 14.
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factual situation that directly contradicted the account rendered pursuant to a writ of novel disseisin. 19 In such cases the jury was apparently nullifying the law in favor of a "just" result. Nor was attaint the
brutal instrument it might seem. Justices only amerced jurors convicted by attaint when the verdict had been complicated with law. 20
The issue of the grand assize,2 1 moreover, compelled jurors to consider
a complex of both law and fact. Justices were sufficiently comfortable
with jurors meddling in law that it took a statute to compel them to
allow the jurors in an assize of novel disseisin to render a special verdict.22 In many areas justices were accustomed to seeing juries handle
law.
Justices also were familiar with the problems inherent in trespass,
with its fictional allegation of jurisdictional codes. Those allegations
allowed inappropriate suits to enter the king's court in disguise. 23 For
the system to work, juries had to overlook the jurisdictional words.
To give justice in the case, the jurors had to render a verdict under
oath that was not strictly true, but rather somewhat embroidered.
This situation is particularly interesting. Trespass was a wrong closely
associated with crime, and it used the same general issue. Why would
justices feel more uncomfortable with the criminal jury than with
other juries? In short, the concern felt by medieval justices at jury
nullification could not have been too deep; the criminal trial jury was
no different from other juries. These concerns integrate the history of
the criminal trial jury with the history of English law as such. They
also explain the continuity of criminal jury interventjon in medieval
England.
The self-informing character of the jury plays a large role in
Green's analysis. He supposes, guardedly, that the jury remained
mainly self-informing until the mid-fifteenth century (p. 105). Theimplication is that evidence was not presented until then. But already in
the 1290s the presentation of evidence was separate from pleading in
trials concerning property.24 The expectation that evidence would be
19. See R. PALMER, THE WHILTON DISPUTE, 1264-1380: A SOCIAL-LEGAL STUDY OF DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 119-22 (1984).
20. Id. at 78-83.
21. The issue is "who has greater right,'' representing a complex mixture of law and fact.
THE TREATISE ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF THE REALM OF ENGLAND COMMONLY CALLED
GLANVILL 33 (G. Hall ed. & trans. 1965).
22. Statute of Westminster II, 1285, 13 Edw. 1, c. 30.
23. S. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 286-90 (2d ed. 1981).
24. See R. PALMER, supra note 19, at 228-31. The first form of evidence in property cases
was probably written evidence, which could not be thrust on the jurors: they had to ask for it.
In the 1290s the party or his lawyer could present the facts as he saw them, although there was
no submission Of testimony under oath or formal cross-examination. Id. In the criminal case,
counsel was not formally allowed and the accused was specifically not to testify under oath.
Testifying under oath, it should be noted, was not a burden, but a benefit, since it reinforced the
credibility of the testimony given.
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presented, as well as the procedures for punishing maintenance, would
not encourage the noncriminal trial jury to engage in informationgathering. And if the jury was essentially not self-informing in noncriminal areas, the jurors in a criminal trial might well not expect to be
self-informing either. The first form of evidence to be expected would
be the accused's version of the facts. The standardized renditions of
self-defense situations could thus be as much a result of jury acceptance of the accused's story as of jury fabrication of a story of its own. 25
The judges might then have commented on such evidence. We do not
know. But if the criminal trial jury remained self-informing for two
centuries longer than other juries, that would be both surprising and
interesting.
The few surviving reports of criminal cases would have fortified
Green's treatment. 26 They graphically illustrate the unmediated confrontation between the justice and the accused. 27 But they also show
that strict pleading carried over from the common law. One justice
was willing to ignore double jeopardy considerations because of the
order of pleading. 28 These reports are too interesting to pass by
lightly. 29
Green notes that the criminal trial jury was immune from attaint
process. He rejects, properly, the argument that that immunity was a
holdover from the divine orientation of the ordeal. He prefers the explanation that jury discretion simply was always a given (pp. 19-20).
His explanation is not completely satisfying. There are two instances
in which attaint was allowed on criminal trial juries in Guernsey and
Jersey. 30 Subjecting the criminal trial jury to attaint was thus not un25. At one point Green allows that the accused might have told his story. P. 96. That would
make good sense from the 1290s on. If the accused told his own story, the jury might simply
follow that account. That form of proceeding would yield a rather more passive jury intervention than Green envisages. Overall he supposes a very active jury, one that purposely embroidered the facts. If the jury merely followed the lead of the accused, one would then have to
account for the characterization that such accused persons used. In part, people would simply
have known how to characterize what had happened: they had seen criminal trials, been on
criminal juries, or heard of cases. In part, however, they would have been informed of the proper
defense by lawyers. Although they ought not to have had access to counsel, those accused still
could rely on their lawyers. Dufflzus v. Merk is a case in which a lawyer lost his retainer for not
rendering advice to one indicted for homicide, despite the fact that by law he ought not to have
done so. Palmer, The Origins ofthe Legal Profession in England, 11 IRISH JURIST (n.s.) 126, 13031 (1976).
26. 3 YEAR BOOKS OF THE REIGN OF KING EowARD THE FIRST 528-45 (1863) [hereinafter
cited as YEAR BOOKS]. Other criminal reports have survived, but they are not as illuminating on
these points as those from the 1290s. See 1 THE EYRE OF NORTHAMPTONSHIRE, 1329-1330, at
151-244 (D. Sutherland ed. & trans. 1983).
27. 3 YEAR BOOKS, supra note 26, at 529-32.
28. Id. at 537.
29. Green adverts to these reports only by way of Summerson's paper. Pp. 15 n.47, 18 n.58.
30. [E]adem jurata dicebat ipsum esse infidelem inponens ei crimen latrocinii, unde idem
Galfridus occasione veredicti illius jurate fugit ad ecclesiam . . • . Quia vero idem Galfridus
postea ad nos accessit et optulit ponere se super veredictum xxiiij. proborum et legalium
hominum trium vicinarum villatarum de crimine illo, et petiit a nobis id ei concedi, tibi
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thinkable. In those two cases, however, the plaintiff had escaped and
was outside the appropriate jurisdiction. Those convicted within England were hanged so quickly, perhaps, that no substantial body of
complainants survived to make such reconsiderations worth a regular
remedy. Beyond that practical lack of pressure, the criminal trial jury
probably seemed more like the grand assize, which was never subject
to attaint. Both the grand assize and the criminal trial jury considered
the broadest possible relevant question and were concerned with
finality. 31
The medieval part of Green's book requires some alterations.
None of them, however, affects the main thesis. And the utility of his
framework is that it both encourages the formulation of questions and
suggests the significance of possible answers.

******

Verdict According to Conscience is intentionally episodic. Green
refers to his book as a series of essays (p. ix). The book is much more
than that, although it does fall short of an integrated history of the
criminal jury. The omissions, thus, are worthy of note, at least to indicate further avenues into the subject. 32 Those areas include the early
seventeenth-century history of the criminal trial jury, the role of
Magna Carta, c. 29, 33 and the nature of seventeenth-century treatises.
Green's treatment of the seventeenth-century jury concentrates on
the trials of Lilbume, Penn, and Bushel. That is indeed where the
major emphasis should fall. A comprehensive treatment, however,
would include the Petition of Right. 34 The Petition of Right was a
source of Lilburne's thought. 35 One of the concerns in the Petition
was martial law prosecutions for ordinary felony cases; it referred specifically to Magna Carta, c. 29. 36 The argument had to go beyond
mere due process to a claim of trial by jury. The growing opposition
precipimus quod secundum consuetudinem predicte insule juratam xxiiij. proborum et
legalium hominum ei inde habere facias ....
2 CLOSE ROLLS OF THE REIGN OF HENRY Ill PRESERVED IN THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE
597-98 (1905); see also 3 id. at 172, 177, 334, 355, 511.
31. This suggestion is original. Milsom has accepted a different argument: that attaint was
not available on a criminal trial jury because the ·~ury was the defendant's own proof, chosen by
himself." S. MILSOM, supra note 23, at 411. The accused, however, did not actually choose his
jurors. He could only challenge jurors, and the challenges would be tried. Moreover, it is hard
to believe that choice had any influence on the availability of attaint on the petty assizes.
32. One omission, probably wisely made, is the perplexing problem of whether or not there
was an increase in crime during times of food shortage. Even though this might have been a
major area of jury intervention, the whole subject is still so controverted that little can be concluded thus far.
33. l SOURCES OF ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, supra note 2, at 115. Note that the
classical c. 29 was c. 39 in the 1215 version of the Magna Carta.
34. 1 B. SCHWARTZ, TuE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 19-21 (1971).
35. See L. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 289 (1968).
36. l B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 34, at 20-21.
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to Charles I at the time of the Petition was such that juries would have
tended to be merciful. Royal use of martial law acknowledged that
possibility. The importance is not less for being implicit. The force of
Lilburne's argument rested in part on its foundation in the Petition of
Right.
Both Lilburne and the Quakers relied on Magna Carta, c. 29, in
asserting jury control over the law. Green dissects the course of the
debate that led up to Vaughan's decision in Bushel's Case but pays
little attention to the role of Magna Carta. The history of Magna
Carta in the seventeenth century, however, may be particularly relevant. That provision concerned proceedings "by lawful judgment of
his peers or by the law of the land." 37 "Lawful judgment of his peers"
had originally referred to judgment by feudal court, which was a true
communal court that did not use juries.38 The community, one's
peers, rendered judgments, not verdicts. The presiding officer merely
presided. Equation of "peers" with members of the trial jury,39 however, yields the odd result that a jury could render a judgment ("by the
lawful judgment of his peers"), whereas juries properly gave verdicts
and justices rendered judgments.
That historically accidental linguistic paradox probably played a
substantial role in the more radical theories calling for jury control of
the law. Green's rendition of even Starling's commentary on Penn
would indicate such an interpretation:
The defendants, [Starling] continued, misinterpreted Magna Carta's
most famous chapter. "By lawful judgment of his peers, or by the law of
the land" did not guarantee trial by peers who acted as judges. As it was
in the "disjunctive," the Crown might employ the "law of the land,"
which must mean trial by both judge and jury ("peers"). [p. 229]

Starling seemed to accept that the first part of the disjunctive provision
would yield jurors as judges. The Crown, however, could choose to
utilize also the second half, which introduced a more substantial role
for the justices. Green does not delve into this linguistic derivation of
jury right; it would be interesting to know how important it was.
Seventeenth-century treatises raise an equally interesting question.
Writers worked in a seeming air of unreality. How could it have been
a matter of controversy whether attaint lay on a criminal trial jury?
Attaint had never been available on properly English criminal juries
(pp. 19-20). The last expansion of attaint was in 1275.40 But since the
petty assizes had largely gone out of use, so had the attaint.4t The
37. 1 SOURCES OF ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, supra note 2, at 121.
38. Palmer, Economic and Cultural Impact, supra note 4, at 392-95.
39. That equation can already be observed in the 1290s. 3 YEAR BOOKS, supra note 26, at
531.
40. Statute of Westminster I, 1275, 3 Edw. 1, c. 38 (1275), expanded attaint from the possessory assizes to other inquests relating to free tenements, subject to special mandate from the king.
41. J. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 117 (2d ed. 1979),
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discussion was academic, but also pressing. The old writs were valuable sources of legal principle, even if they were no longer in use; that
style of argument is familiar both from Coke42 and from Blackstone.43
The minor debate over attaint must seem perplexing without reference
to the character of seventeenth-century legal debate.
The argument of Chapter Four, it should be noted, is somewhat
strained. That chapter is the institutional overview and serves to establish the continuity of jury nullification, albeit at a lesser level than
in the fourteenth century. Less ground work has been done in common-run felony. Green realizes that the argument is strained (pp. 15052), but he is convincing nonetheless. Given both the fifteenth- and
seventeenth-century record, it would be very hard to imagine sixteenth-century juries as completely passive and never inclined to
render merciful verdicts.

******

One of the more interesting aspects of eighteenth-century treatises
dealing with the jury in seditious libel prosecutions is the choice of
analogies. Pro-jury writers analogized seditious libel to homicide.
Green points out the strength of the homicide analogy and raises as his
own alternative an analogy to theft (pp. 343-45). Since homicide can
be justified or properly excused, juries in homicide cases have a larger
role and thus a greater capacity for intervention. Theft would have
provided an analogy more favorable to traditional seditious libel
doctrine.
But the choice between homicide and theft is somewhat more complex. Hamburger, in a recent article on seditious libel,44 reaches a different conclusion. Homicide, he says, produced a rebuttable
presumption of malice; larceny produced no such presumption, so that
it was better to acquit in doubtful cases.45 For Hamburger, an analogy
with larceny would have yielded not a stronger but a more lenient law
of seditious libel.
The impact of the analogy with theft is perhaps less important than
the possible impact of blasphemy and obscenity. Historians have
treated seditious libel as an isolated category. But blasphemous and
obscene libel were also criminal libels, exactly analogous to seditious
libel.46 The law for criminal libel was consistent, and Fox's Libel
Act47 in terms concerned criminal libel and apparently applied also to
42. See 12 E. COKE, REPORTS 74; s. WHITE, SIR EDWARD COKE AND "THE GRIEVANCES
OF THE COMMONWEALTH," 1621-1628, at 51-52 (1979).
43. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *268-69.
44. Hamburger, The Development of the Law of Seditious Libel and the Control of the Press,
37 STAN. L. REV. 661 (1985). Green uses the article. P. 253 n.208.
45. Hamburger, supra note 44, at 704 (citing both Coke and Hale).
46. Blackstone treats them all together. 4 w. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, *150-51.
47. 32 Geo. 3, c. 60 (1792).
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blasphemous and obscene libel. Blasphemy and obscenity in the eighteenth century could hardly have seemed justifiable or properly excusable. Seditious libel might seem likewise unexcusable, such that from
a merely legal perspective only the fact of publication would remain
for jury determination. That stronger analogy renders the old doctrine of seditious libel somewhat more understandable.
Verdict According to Conscience is well-written, thoughtful, and
thought-provoking. Green admirably pulls together current research
and provides a structure for future research on the criminal trial jury.
No work of this scope can be definitive. Nor did Green intend to be
definitive in setting out these essays. His book will be subject to continuing attack on many fronts, as others fill omissions in his coverage
and correct elements of his thesis. That is the burden of making a
broad contribution to a subject rich in specialized researchers. His
basic thesis will survive. But the book was not even intended to stand
forever. By providing a coherent focus and context for the subject,
Verdict According to Conscience will further the specialized research
that will make it obsolete. For now, however, it is the mandatory
starting point for understanding the history of the criminal trial jury.

